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Notes
SUSPENSION OF STATE INSOLVENCY LAWS BY
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
The Constitution of the United States confers on Con-
gress the power to enact "uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States".' Is this power
exclusively in Congress or may the various states also enact
bankruptcy or insolvency laws? If the power in the states
is concurrent with that of Congress until the exercise of
the power by the latter, what is the extent of the effect
to be given to the enactment by Congress of bankruptcy
laws? In its varying phases, these questions have been
judicially discussed ever since the adoption of the Con-
stitution and are, even yet, not uniformly decided by the
various courts.
It was early decided that the mere existence of the
power in Congress, when not exercised, did not prevent
state legislation on the subject. 2 This question is now a
moot one and likely to remain so indefinitely.
Since Congress first exercised its power by enacting
a bankruptcy law in 180,3 the more difficult problem of
the effect of the exercise by Congress of its power on the
operation of state statutes on insolvencies or bankruptcies
has been reappearing constantly. Because the Act of July
1, 1898, and its amendments have so largely covered the
field, the most acute problem has been the effect of state
insolvency laws on persons exempted from either voluntary
or involuntary proceedings or both under the federal act.
The Bankruptcy Act excepts from involuntary proceed-
ings wage-earners or persons engaged chiefly in farming
or tillage of the soil.5 It also requires that the one against
1Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4.
2Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton 196 (1819); Ogden v.
Saunders, 12 Wheaton 213 (1827) and Farmers' Bank v. Smith, 3
S. & R. 63 (1817) reversed on other grounds--6 Wheaton 131 (18211.'
sApril 4, 1800, 2 U. S. St. at L. 19.
'30 U. S. St. at L. 544.
sBankruptcy Act, Section 4, subdivision b,
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whom proceedings are taken shall owe one thousand dollars
or over.6 To what extent, if any, does the Insolvency Act
of Pennsylvania7 apply to these persons?
The first Bankruptcy Act of 180S contained an express
provision that it should not repeal or annul any present or
future laws of any state except so far as the same might
affect persons who were or might be within the purview
of that act.9 The opinion has been expressed that the ques-
tion would not be difficult under that act and that it was
unfortunate that the later acts did not contain the same
or some similar provision declaring its effect on state
insolvency laws. But the question as to what was meant
by those "within the purview" of the act would still be
difficult of solution. Are those expressly exempted from
only one of the two procedures in the Bankruptcy Act
within the "purview" of it?
The opinion has been. expressed by many courts and
writers that the state laws are suspended only in so far
as they are in conflict with the federal Bankruptcy Act.
Since that act excludes wage-earners and farmers and per-
sons owing less than one thousand dollars from those who
may be adjudged involuntary bankrupts, no conflict was
seen in a state law allowing involuntary insolvency pro-
ceedings to be taken against such persons. Exclusion by
Congress was not considered equivalent to an expression of
intent that such persons were to be free from all invol-
untary proceedings in bankruptcy or insolvency, either
federal or state.10
This view has been consistently upheld by the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania. Numerous cases decided in this
court hold that the federal Bankruptcy Act does not sus-
pend the operation of the Pennsylvania Act in its applica-
tion to farmers. These cases hold that there may be in-
OBankruptcy Act, Section 4, subdivision b.
7June 4, 1901, P. L. 404.
8See note 3.
'Section 61.
1OSee Collier on Bankruptcy, (13th ed., '1923) vol. 1, page 9 et seq.;
7 C. J. Z1-25; 11 U. S. C. A. page 6 et seq.; L. R. A. 1917 A, 109 n.
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voluntary proceedings under the state act against farmers
and wage-earners. The same has been held as to persons
owing less than one thousand dollars.12
Several Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cases suggest-
ed the problem but did not decide it, either deciding on
other grounds or holding that the question was not raised
below or argued on appeal.'1 The question was discussed,
however, in a case decided in 1930.14 The Court cites with
approval the holding of the Superior Court that the state
act is not suspended as to those excluded from the opera-
tion of the federal act, such as farmers. The Court also
declares that the state act is valid and enforceable in cases
'where there is no exception in the federal act unless and
until the federal act is called into operation by appropriate
proceedings. Under this holding there is no automatic
suspension of the state act but either system is available
to creditors or debtors until the superior system is made
&ffective by taking the necessary steps to call it into force.
The latest United States Supreme Court decision dis-
cussing suspension of state insolvency laws by the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 is International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus." The
case involved voluntary proceedings taken under a state
insolvency law by a merchant who owed debts amounting
to ten thousand dollars. The case is not, therefore, a direct
authority on the question of the effect of the Bankruptcy
Act on state insolvency laws in so far as they apply to
persons excepted from the national act since the debtor
"Potts v. Smith Mfg. Co., 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 206 (1904); Citizens'
Bank v. Gass, 29 Pa. Super. Ct. 125 (1905); Charles v. Smith, 29 Pa.
Super. Ct. 594 (1905); Rittenhouse's Insolvent Estate, 30 Pa. Super.
Ct. 468 (1906); Miller v. Jackson, 34, Pa. Super. Ct. 31 (1907) and
Hoover v. Ober, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 308 (1910). See also 39 P. S. Sec.
1, historical note and notes 1-3,. 5, 6.
12Landis Machinery Co. v. Cooper, 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 416 (1913)-
in this case a corporation.
13Beck v. Parker, 65 Pa. 262 (1870); Barber v. Rogers, 71 Pa. 362
(1872); Strawn v. lams, 247 Pa. 132 (1915).
"Walker v. Emerick, 300 Pa. 9, 13 (1930).
15278 U. S. 261 (1929); 49 Sup. Ct. Rept. 108; 73 L. Ed. 318-
opinion by Mr. Justice Butler with Mr. Justices McReynolds,Brandeis,
and Sanford dissenting without an opinion.
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was not within the excepted class. However, the reason-
ing used to justify the holding that the state act was sus-
pended discloses a broad effect to be given the suspensory
power of the Bankruptcy Act and is equally applicable to
the question being discussed by us.
Mr. Justice Butler says, "The power of Congress to
establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States is unrestricted and para-
mount. The purpose to exclude state action for the dis-
charge of insolvent debtors may be manifested without
specific declaration to that end; thlat which is clearly im-
plied is of equal force as that which is expressed. * * * * The
general rule is that an intention wholly to exclude state action
will not be implied unless, when fairly interpreted, an act
of Congress is plainly in conflict with state regulation of
the same subject. * * * * In respect of bankruptcies the
intention of Congress is plain. The national purpose to
establish uniformity necessarily excludes state regula-
tion. * * ** Congress did not intend to give insolvent debt-
ors seeking discharge, or their creditors seeking to collect
their claims, choice between the relief provided by the
Bankruptcy Act and that specified in state insolvency
laws."6 States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere
with or complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide ad-
ditional or auxiliary remedies. * * * * It is clear that the
provisions of the Arkansas law governing the distribution
of property of insolvents for the payment of their debts
and providing for their discharge, or that otherwise relate
to the subject of bankruptcies, are within the field entered
by Congress when it passed the Bankruptcy Act and
'8 This statement seems contrary to that in 300 Pa. at 13, where
the Court said that in cases covered by the federal act, the state
laws are effective until the national laws are called into operation by
appropriate proceedings. This would give the choice that the U. S.
Supreme Court says was not intended. See also Hull's Assigned
Egtate, 25 Pa. C. C. 353 where Stewart, J. holds that suspension only
occurs when the Bankruptcy Act is actually resorted to by debtors
or creditors. Cf. Littlefield v. Gay, 52 Att. 925 (Me. 1902) where the
Court holds the suspension to be automatic, See also 14 Dickinson
Law Review 174-176.
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therefore such provisions must be held to have been
superseded. * * * * The enforcement of state insolvency
systems, whether held to be in pursuance of statutory
provisions or otherwise, would necessarily conflict witlh
the national purpose to have uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies throughout the United States. * * * * And,
as the passage of the Bankruptcy Act superseded the state
law, at least in so far as it relates to the distribution of
property and releases to be given, plaintiff in error is en-
titled to have its judgment paid."17
The Court, therefore, clearly held that when Congress
entered the field of bankruptcy laws, i. e., laws for the
distribution of the property of insolvent debtors and re-
leases from debts, the entire field is covered, either ex-
pressly or impliedly, by the federal legislation and nothing
remains on which state laws may operate. This suspension
of state laws occurs automatically by virtue of the act of
Congress and does not await or depend upon the resort by
either creditors or debtors to the proceedings provided by
the federal act.
That entry into the field of bankruptcy laws precludes
any state legislation on the same subject is demonstrated
by the cases cited by the Supreme Court. N. Y. C. R. R.
v. Winfield1 8 is cited. That case held that Congress by en-
acting the Federal Employers' Liability Act covered the
whole field of injuries occurring to employees in interstate
commerce, leaving nothing on which state laws could be
operative. Prigg v. Pennsylvania9 is also cited as analogous.
The question of the suspension of state laws arose under
the Fugitive Slave Act of Congress. In holding that the
state law was suspended, Mr. Justice Story used language
that would be equally applicable to our situation. He said,
inter alia, "The Act may be said to cover the whole ground
of the Constitution * * * * not because it exhausts the
remedies which may be applied by Congress to enforce the
rights * * * * but because it points out fully all the modes
"Italics in opinion added.
41244 U. S. 147 (1917).
1916 Peters 539, 617(1842).
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of attaining those objects which Congress, in their dis-
cretion, have as yet deemed expedient or proper to meet
the exigencies of the Constitution. * * * * In such a
case, the legislation of Congress, in what it does prescribe,
manifestly indicates, that it does not intend that there
shall be any further legislation to act upon the subject
matter. Its silence as to what it does not do is as ex-
pressive of what its intention is as the direct provisions
made by it. * * * * For, if Congress have a constitu-
tional power to regulate a particular subject, and they do
actually regulate it in a given manner and in a certain
form, it cannot be that the state legislatures have a right to
interfere, and, as it were, by way of complement to the
legislation of Congress, to prescribe additional regulations,
and what they may deem auxiliary provisions for the same
purpose".
Applying the doctrine of the Pinkus case, there can be
no involuntary proceedings under the state insolvency act
against wage-earners, farmers, or persons owing less than
one thousand dollars. Congress by enacting the Bank-
ruptcy Act has exhausted the field of legislation on this
subject so far as the states are concerned. Congress, by
exempting those enumerated from involuntary proceedings
has declared, in effect, its will that such persons may not
be compelled to hand over their property for distribution.
20
The supremacy of the federal law is a myth and a delusion
if in the face of these express exemptions, a state may
compel involuntary distribution of their property by such
persons. We must conclude that the Pennsylvania decisions
enumerated above can no longer be considered the law in
view of the holding of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Pinkus case.
Harold S. Irwin
20Cf. Closser v. Strawn, 227 Fed. 139 (D. C. Pa. 1915). With this
case the Circuit Court of Appeals-3rd Circuit-Pa.--disagreed. In re
McElwain, 296 Fed. 112 (1924). This latter case is clearly erroneous
and holds that the Pa. Act of 1901 is not a bankruptcy act. Cf. with
principal case on this point.
